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Abstract. New approaches to synthesize and manipulate face videos
at very high quality have paved the way for new applications in com-
puter animation, virtual and augmented reality, or face video analysis.
However, there are concerns that they may be used in a malicious way,
e.g. to manipulate videos of public figures, politicians or reporters, to
spread false information. The research community therefore developed
techniques for automated detection of modified imagery, and assem-
bled benchmark datasets showing manipulatons by state-of-the-art tech-
niques. In this paper, we contribute to this initiative in two ways: First,
we present a new audio-visual benchmark dataset. It shows some of the
highest quality visual manipulations available today. Human observers
find them significantly harder to identify as forged than videos from other
benchmarks. Furthermore we propose new family of deep-learning-based
fake detectors, demonstrating that existing detectors are not well-suited
for detecting fakes of a quality as high as presented in our dataset. Our
detectors examine spatial and temporal features. This allows them to
outperform existing approaches both in terms of high detection accu-
racy and generalization to unseen fake generation methods and unseen
identities.
1 Introduction
Accelerated by new combinations of model-based and deep learning-based ap-
proaches face video editing and synthesis approaches have reached unprecedented
levels of visual realism [54]. On the one hand, methods enable high-quality reen-
actment [40,24,41], i.e. face expressions in video are manually modified or trans-
ferred from another video. Some also empower face swapping, i.e. replacing the
face interior with a different face identity [18]; other popular implementations
exist on GitHub [1,3]. These capabilities allow new applications in virtual real-
ity, such as head-set removal for telepresence [43], or in visual effects creation,
such as visual dubbing [19,38,23], and others. However, concerns arose that they
could be misused to modify face videos of public figures or reporters in an un-
ethical way or with the intent of misinformation. The research community has
therefore developed techniques to detect such modifications and to verify authen-
ticity of imagery, whether for generic content [7,4,47] or specifically for faces
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Fig. 1. We present the first large-scale dataset of high-quality face video fakes. Our
dataset contains audio and is challenging for human detection. We also present a novel
detector that examines a hybrid of features. Our detector outperforms existing tech-
niques and produces good generalization to unseen fake generation methods.
[34,5,35,16]. Also, commendable efforts lead to larger benchmark datasets to
develop and compare detection methods were released, both for images [53,22]
and videos [26,22,34,15,13]. For instance, FaceForensics++ [34] contains internet
videos modified by several face synthesis techniques [1,3,40,41,15].
In this paper, we contribute to the detection of manipulated face videos in
two ways. First, although face image/video datasets cover various generation
methods, we found even the best manipulations be easily unmasked by humans.
We therefore propose VideoForensicsHQ, a benchmark dataset of high quality
face video manipulations. It is one of the first face video manipulation benchmark
sets that also contains audio and thus complements existing datsets along a
new challenging dimension. VideoForensicsHQ shows manipulations at much
higher video quality and resolution, and shows manipulations that are provably
much harder to detect by humans than videos in existing data sets. To generate
these results, we built on Deep Video Portraits [24]. A user-study shows that
manipulations in VideoForensicsHQ are rated “real” at least 65.8% of the time,
while the highest-quality reenactments in existing datasets [34] are rated “real”
only 15% of the time. In total, our dataset contains 1,666,816 frames. It contains
1737 videos covering a wide variety of emotions. Second, we propose a new family
of neural network-based detectors that examine low-level noise features, RGB
color and temporal correlations. Comparisons see them outperform state-of-the-
art detection methods on high quality manipulations. They also generalize well
to unseen identities and to data generated by unseen methods.
2 Related Work
In the following we review face video reenactment and editing techniques, bench-
mark datasets, and manipulation detection techniques.
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Face Reenactment and Editing Methods: Face reenactment techniques al-
low the control of face expressions in a target video [40,24,23,30,48,21,49,51].
Many extract expressions of target faces by fitting a parametric face model [20],
and then re-synthesize the face with parameters copied from a source video
[40,24,23,30]. Kim et al. [24] for the first time showed space-time coherent realis-
tic global face pose and expression editing in videos by means of a GAN. Deferred
Neural Rendering [41] can synthesize realistic face imagery using learned feature
textures. Popular public implementations of face manipulation techniques [1,3]
require large corpora of training data to achieve sufficient quality. We refer to [23]
for a more comprehensive overview.
Face Manipulation Datasets: Several datasets of manipulated still images
[53,22] or videos [26,22,34,13] exist. Zhou et al. [53] provide 2010 images gen-
erated by the manipulation approaches of [3,2]. Guan et al. [22] presented a
dataset containing 50,000 manipulated images and 500 manipulated videos. Ko-
rshunov et al. [26] presented a dataset of 620 manipulated videos of 43 subjects.
Roessler et al. [34]’s FaceForensics++ dataset contains 1,000 videos, each manip-
ulated by 4 different techniques: DeepFakes [1], FaceSwap [3], Face2Face [40], and
Neural Textures [41]. Their results show that many manipulation approaches,
in particular DeepFakes [1] and FaceSwap [3], produce very noticeable artefacts.
Also, none of these datasets provides audio with the videos. Google released
the Deep Fake Detection Dataset [15]. It contains over 3000 manipulated videos
(with unknown techniques) from 28 actors in various scenes. Many sequences ex-
hibit notable visual artefacts; audio is not provided. Facebook recently released
a large dataset of manipulated face videos [13]. The quality of the generated
videos varies and faces are of low resolution (often much less than 299 × 299).
The techniques used for manipulating the videos have not been disclosed.
Detection of Manipulated Visual Content: There is a lot of previous work
on detecting computer-generated visual content. We summarize the most related
methods and refer the reader to [44,45] for more details. Detection techniques
can be coarsely segmented into approaches for faces [53,4,32,5,35,34,28,16,31]
and approaches for generic content [17,11,12,8,33,27,52,7,50,10,47]. Generic tech-
niques usually examine low-level features such as high-frequency components and
noise. Fridrich et al. [17] introduced convolutional kernels designed for steganal-
ysis that several works in the domain of fake detection built on. Cozzolino et
al. [11] combined some of these kernels with an SVM-based classifier. In [12] the
residual-based descriptors of [17] are formulated as a constrained convolutional
neural network (CNN). Bayar et al. [8,7] suppress image content to focus on
low-level patterns. Zhou et al. [52] use a two-stream network to detect edited
content in images. One stream examines the image content while the other ex-
amines noise features. The work of [10] localizes edited regions of an image by
examining the so-called “noiseprints” of camera models. Wang et al. [47] showed
that a standard image classifier trained on one CNN generator can generalize
well to data produced by unseen architectures. The classifier is trained on a large
volume of data with careful pre- and post-processing plus data augmentation.
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Results show high classification accuracy on a wide variety of unseen network
architectures, including architectures for face generation.
Face-specific detection techniques can be classified into single-image-based
[53,4,32,5,34,46,28,16,47] and multiple-image based [35,14,31] approaches. Zhou et
al. [53] detect face swaps using a two stream network: One stream is trained to
detect facial tampering artifacts while the other studies steganalysis features.
Raghavendra et al. [32] detect whether a face is morphed from two different
faces. Afchar et al. [4] proposed MesoInc-4 , an inception-inspired [39] convo-
lutional neural network with a small number of layers. MesoInc-4 stacks the
output of several convolutional layers with different kernel shapes, to learn at
which level of granularity the input should be investigated. Ro¨ssler et al. [34]
examined a variety of manipulation detection techniques [17,11,12,8,33,4] on the
large FaceForensics++ dataset. Across different levels of compression, Xception-
Net [9] turned out to be the most robust detector in this study. Durall et al. [16]
classified the Discrete Fourirer Transform (DFT) of images using support vec-
tor machines, logistic regression and k-means. They reported very good results
for high-resolution images. Other works have studied temporal correlations to
achieve higher accuracy [6,35,6,5]. Agarwal et al. [5] learn a person-specific sig-
nature by extracting so-called “action units”, that capture characteristic move-
ments of known identities. An SVM is used to distinguish individuals. Sabir et
al. [35] proposed a detector based on a recurrent neural network.
3 VideoForensicsHQ Dataset
Existing datasets for fake detection, such as FaceForensics++ [34], cover many
state-of-the-art face synthesis techniques [1,3,40,41]. This breadth is valuable
to benchmark and develop detection techniques, given a range of edit types
(reenactment, face swap etc.). We provide VideoForensicsHQ, a new large scale
and high-quality dataset of manipulated face video. VideoForensicsHQ comple-
ments existing datasets in several ways: First, most existing datasets only provide
video, leaving out the speech audio channel. We argue that multi-modal analysis
can open interesting questions for forgery detection in the near future. Second,
community videos modified with state-of-the-art approaches frequently exhibit
artefacts clearly visible to the human eye (see Fig. 2). As a result they are easily
spotted by humans, which we could confirm in a user study (see Tab. 1).
One of the most discussed malevolent use cases is the modification of videos
of public figures or politicians to disseminate wrong information. This threat,
however, rests on the assumption that modifications cannot be detected by hu-
man observers. Most existing benchmark video sets do not reach this level of
visual quality.
Providing benchmark data of high visual quality is key to model a more
realistic threat scenario, anticipating improved capabilities of future face video
synthesis algorithms. VideoForensicsHQ therefore contributes a large number of
manipulated face videos with speech of previously unseen video resolution and
visual modification quality (section 3.1). Our dataset contains self-reenactment
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Fig. 2. Samples from existing face manipulation datasets. Most datasets contain no-
ticeable visual artefacts. Neural textures [34] is of the highest visual quality in current
datasets, and hence we focused our user-study on studying it. For more detail on the
user-study please see the supplemental document.
manipulations, where the source and the target videos are the same. This design
choice closely resembles the aforementioned scenario, where the speech of a world
leader is modified, while maintaining his/her face identity, audio integrity and
the remaining scene components, e.g., illumination, background and so on.
For the creation of our dataset, we rely on an extended version of Deep
Video Portraits [24], allowing us to produce high visual quality for a sufficiently
large number of videos (section 3.2). A user study shows that our modified
videos are significantly harder to detect by human observers than videos in
FaceForensics++ (see Tab. 1).
VideoForensicsHQ subsets
Subset Fake frames Real frames
group#1 60,058 119,992
group#2 74,765 190,259
group#3 192,150 1,029,592
total 32,6973 1,339,843
User study results
Source
Rated
“fake”
Rated
“real”
“Neural Textures” fakes [34] 85.7% 14.3%
VideoForensicsHQ fakes 34.2% 65.8%
Real videos 15.0% 85.0%
Tab 1. VideoForensicsHQ contains 326,973 frames of manipulated content produced
by an enhanced implementation of Kim et al. [24]. Videos from VideoForensicsHQ are
rated “real” 65.8% of the time, which compares favourably to FaceForensics++’s Neural
Textures (the highest-quality method in that dataset). Our study also shows a baseline
error of 15% where unmodified videos were incorrectly detected as “fake”.
3.1 VideoForensicsHQ At-A-Glance
VideoForensicsHQ contains 1737 videos of speaking faces (44% male, 56% fe-
male), with 8 different emotions (Fig. 3), most of them of “HD” resolution. The
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videos amount to 1,666,816 frames. Tab. 1 (left) shows the number of frames
for the different groups of our data. Here, group#1 is mined from [23], group#2
from RAVDSS [29], and group#3 from YouTube. In group#1 each emotion is
performed twice, and therefore we use one for training and other for testing. For
the remaining groups we approximately use a 67%− 33% training-test split. In
total, our dataset contains 326973 frames of fake content synthesized with the
approach in section 3.2. This is comparable in size to the 306350 frames produced
by the high-quality rendering approach of Thies et al. [41] in FaceForensics++.
Durations Emotions
Image Resolution Gender DistributionData Samples
Fig. 3. Samples from our VideoForensicsHQ dataset and corresponding statistics. Our
dataset offers a previously unseen level of visual quality, contains audio, and covers
a variety of expressions, age, illuminations and backgrounds. Synthesized content of
VideoForensicsHQ is much harder to detect by human observers than previous datasets.
3.2 Creation of VideoForensicsHQ
Mining Training and Test Segments Our face reenactments are produced
on data mined from three input sources: 1) sequences from the work of Kim et
al. [23], 2) the Ryerson Audio-Visual Database of Emotional Speech and Song
(RAVDESS) [29] and 3) YouTube. We now describe how to identify suitable
subsequences in this candidate set, and filter out unwanted scene or jump cuts.
Facial reenactment is more likely to exhibit artefacts on large, out-of-plane
face poses. Hence, to ensure high visual quality of manipulated faces, we train
our face reenactment approach on long video sub-segments of the original source
videos, in the range of 5 - 10 minutes, showing near-frontal faces. To automat-
ically find these, we run a facial landmark detector [37] on all frames of all
source videos. This produces 66 landmark positions for every frame fi, and one
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confidence value in the range [0, 1] for every landmark position. Based on the
landmarks, we compute three metrics:
1. ci: average confidence of the 66 landmarks for frame fi
2. di: average difference between the landmark positions in fi and the landmark
positions in fi−1, divided by the size of the face. Face size is taken as the
average side length of the bounding box of the face landmarks.
3. mean and standard deviations of the ci’s and of the di’s.
A frame is regarded as unsuitable for training if any of the following four cases
are satisfied: 1) ci < 0.2, 2) di > 0.1, 3) ci is less than 0.6 and deviates from
the confidence mean by more than 110% of the standard deviation (in negative
direction), 4) di is greater than 0.025 and deviates from the displacement mean
by more than 110% of the standard deviation (in positive direction). If none of
these conditions apply, the frame is considered suitable for training and added to
the current segment of suitable frames. Here, a segment is defined as a continuous
set of suitable frames, with no scene cuts. We add the longest good segments
to the self-reenactment training set of each identity until 5000 to 6000 frames
are reached. From the remaining segments we create a test set for each identity.
We mask out the background pixels that are not inside the convex hull of the
face landmarks previously estimated. Finally, we crop and scale all frames to a
resolution of 256×256, centered around the face.
Face Reenactment Algorithm To generate our results, we extend the Deep
Video Portraits algorithm [24]. This method uses a rendering-to-real (R2R)
translation network that maps a synthetic computer graphics rendering of a
face to its photoreal equivalent.
The original Deep Video Portraits algorithm does not handle dynamic scene
backgrounds. We therefore modify it to only process the facial region, as defined
by the 66 facial landmarks of Saragih et al. [36].
Instead of a separate conditioning image for the eye-gaze we use only one
input image to the translation network, with the eye-gaze overlayed on the syn-
thetic rendering (see Fig. 4). We use the approach of Garrido et al. [20] to recon-
struct parameters of a parametric 3D face model (PCA coefficients for identity
geometry, PCA coefficient for face albedo, blendshape coefficients for expres-
sion, spherical harmonics coefficients for lighting, 3D head pose) for every frame
of training video. Identity parameters are estimated based on the frame with
highest landmark detection confidence ci, before the remaining parameters of all
frames are computed. The parameters obtained in this way are then rendered,
to produce the conditioning input to the R2R network. We train this network
per sequence, to make it learn the synthetic-to-real mapping. We train for 200
epochs and estimate the mean squared photometric error against ground truth
on the validation set. The model with the smallest error ends up being used for
synthesis.
Fig. 4 shows an overview of our synthetic-to-real translation. During infer-
ence we apply the learned translation model to the synthesized images with
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Input
Synthetic Rendering
with Eye Gaze
Rendering-to-Video
Translation Network
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Fake Video
Composite
Face Mask
Monocular
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Real Video
Face Removed
Background
Network
Output
Fig. 4. We reenact the real input video using a translation network. The network
takes a synthetic rendering of the face only, with the eye-gaze overlayed and with no
background. It produces a photorealistic rendering which is then alpha blended into
the background. This method is a special case of the Deep Video Protraits approach
[24], where source and target sequence coincide.
eye-gaze overlay. This produces photo-realistic renderings that lack plausible
background. We therefore composite them over the input frames, with a smooth
alpha gradient around the background and the edges of the face (based on the
landmarks). The results obtained in this way for group#3 are filtered manually,
to ensure hight visual quality. The results of group#1 are filtered automatically,
based thresholding the mean Euclidean distance between the real and reenacted
videos. No filtering was necessary for group#2.
4 Detecting High-quality Manipulated Face Videos
We propose a family of detectors that examine multiple image features: low-
level noise features, the original RGB color values and temporal correlations
(see Fig. 6). We use XceptionNet [9] as the basis of our detectors, since it was
reported as the most successful detector in [34]. XceptionNet consists of an entry
flow Indαβγδ, a middle flow M, and an exit flow Out. The parameters α, β,γ, δ,
and  specify the number of features per convolutional layer (see supplemental
material), while d specifies the number of input channels. To obtain the original
XceptionNet, one can instantiate these building blocks as the sequence C :=
In3,32,64,128,256,728 ◦M8 ◦Out. C receives RGB images over the range [0, 1] with
mean 12 as input. Its output are two scores, one for class “real” and one for
“fake”, for which we minimize cross-entropy loss. In the following, leading or
trailing zeros in the indices of Ind,α,β,γ,δ, disable the respective layers.
Since the fakes in our proposed dataset very rarely contain strong visual arti-
facts that an image classifier could easily pick up, we have derived a variant that
classifies not frames themselves, but their spatially high-pass-filtered versions:
S := In3,32,64,128,256,728 ◦M0 ◦Out
receives 12 ·(F −g∗F )+ 12 as input, where F ∈ R299×299×3 is a video frame and g
is a Gaussian kernel of size 5, with standard deviation σ = 1.1. Our combination
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of C and S,
CS := (In3,32,64,128,256,364, In3,32,64,128,256,364) ◦M2 ◦Out
receives the same inputs as C and S and fuses the color and noise features
just before entering M2, where the combined receptive field of the convolutional
kernels has size 17× 17. We extend CS to
CST := ((In3,32,64,0,0,0, In3,8,8,0,0,0)◦In0,0,72,128,256,512, In3,16,32,64,128,256)◦M1 ◦Out
which in addition to color and spatial noise receives temporal noise as a third
input (see Fig. 6).
Fig. 5. A result of CST pre-
processing, for a real (left)
and a fake (right) frame
[34]: Normalized color, spa-
tial noise and temporal noise
(from top to bottom). Train-
ing learned threshold t =
0.0129. Since dlib tracks the
videos slightly differently,
even unedited regions show
marginal differences.
Temporal noise is extracted as follows:
1. Spatial low-pass filtering with a Gaussian kernel
of size 49 and deviation σ = 7.7. This suppresses
high spatial frequencies that motion would turn
into high temporal frequences.
2. Temporal high-pass filtering of the form
Ai := −1
4
Fi−1 +
1
2
Fi +−1
4
Fi+1
extracts high temporal frequencies for each
pixel, where Fi is the the frame to be classified.
3. Batch normalization to the range [0; 1] with
mean 12 .
4. Amplitudes below threshold t are dampened by
computing
A′i := thrt(Ai)− thrt(−Ai)
where
thrt(F ) :=
1
f
·
(
ln (1 + exp(x)) +
10
1 + exp(−x)
)
for f := 10t and x := f · (F − t). We initialize t
with 140 and let the training process update it.
See Fig. 6 (bottom-right) for the graph of thrt.
5. Gi := |Ai −Ai−1|.
6. Temporal lowpass filtering ensures stability of the preprocessed signal over
time:
Ti :=
1
32
Gi−2 +
1
8
Gi−1 +
3
16
Gi +
1
8
Gi+1 +
1
32
Gi+2
This preprocessing is supposed to emphasize rapid flickering of parts of the
image, as is often observed in deep fake results, for example in Fig. 5.
C, S, CS and CST are all trained with stochastic gradient descent, with
momentum 0.9 and a weight decay of 10−5. We multiply the initial learning rate
of 0.03 with a decay factor of 0.970.1 after every epoch.
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Fig. 6. Our detectors consist of building blocks extract from XceptionNet [9]. They ex-
amine spatial noise, color information and temporal noise. The latter involves learning
a threshold r that determines the shape of the activation function thrt.
5 Results
We perform a number of experiments to illustrate the high quality of our render-
ings in VideoForensicsHQ. Here, we provide evidence that state-of-the-art de-
tectors struggle with the high level of photorealism of our dataset. Results show
that by focusing on the low-level features of the input, our detectors manage to
outperform existing methods. Furthermore, we demonstrate the generalization
capabilities of our detectors. We examine the generalization to unseen rendering
methods and also to unseen test identities in a few-shot learning setup. Results
show that our detectors consistently outperform existing techniques.
State of the Art Techniques We compare our detectors to a number of
related techniques. The detector C, published as “XceptionNet” [9], performs
best in the FaceForensics++ benchmark [34]. It is the basis of our detectors. We
evaluate MesoInc-4 [4], Bayar et al. [7] and the approach of Durall et al. [16] as
they show good results in analysing low-level features. For every training batch
of Durall et al. [16] we optimize a new SVM model on the Fourier features. At
VideoForensicsHQ 11
validation and test time, we average the predictions of all SVM models obtained
in this way. To evaluate the generalization capabilities of our approach we com-
pare to Wang et al. [47], a very recent classifier that generalizes well to unseen
rendering methods. Due to this claim we do not update its weights during train-
ing, but only optimize a threshold on its singular output value, based on the
ROC curve over the samples that were seen within one epoch of training. We
perform this optimization for 5 epochs and average the 5 resulting thresholds.
Preprocessings and training All input data was preprocessed by com-
puting face bounding boxes using dlib [25], smoothing their coordinates tempo-
rally and extracting constant-size square bounding boxes, scaled to resolution
299 × 299. We resample videos by linear interpolation to a framerate of 25fps.
Frames for which no face bounding box could be found are omitted. For MesoInc-
4we scale the resulting frames to 256×256, whereas for Durall et al.we compute
a 209-dimensional feature vector as specified in [16]. All detectors were trained
with batch size 24, except for MesoInc-4 (512) , Durall et al. (512) and Bayar
et al. (256). Except for Wang et al., all methods are trained with a hard limit
of 100 epochs. We stop training earlier if 5 epochs with a validation accuracy of
more than 99% have been seen (not necessarily consecutively). The model with
maximal validation accuracy is used at test time. To account for imbalances in
the datasets, we randomly sample 10% of the training frames and 20% of the
validation frames in every epoch. Sampling here means to first uniformly select
a class (“real”/“fake”), then a subset (which is relevant for VideoForensicsHQ
because it consists of three different groups), then a subject and then one of the
sequences for this subject. Frames are sampled uniformly from sequences. Since
Durall et al. is not designed for the amounts of data resulting from the aforemen-
tioned sampling rates we lower them to 0.5% training and 1% validation samples
for this method. At test time, we evaluate all frames of the test set, but weigh
per-frame predictions by the probability of a frame being sampled according to
above sampling process.
5.1 Detecting highly photorealistic manipulations
To assess the difficulty of detecting the high quality fakes of our dataset, we
trained our three detectors and the existing techniques on it. As can be seen
in Tab. 2, all our detectors outperform the state of the art on VideoForensic-
sHQ. In addition to higher test accuracies, our detectors achieve peak validation
accuracies much earlier than C/XceptionNet, from which they were derived. Fur-
thermore, evaluation on FaceForensics++ confirms that our detectors perform
well not only on our data. Overall this provides evidence for the claim that the
fakes in VideoForensicsHQ are indeed more challenging to detect. Note that on
VideoForensicsHQ, CS and CST exhibit lower test accuracies than the simpler
S. We believe that this is due the design choice of dedicating considerably fewer
channels to spatial noise at the end of the In module in CS and CST. This was
necessary to limit the memory footprint during training.
Tab. 2 reports slightly lower accuracies for MesoInc-4 and Bayar et al. on
FaceForensics++ than [34], whereas the detectors based on XceptionNet, includ-
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FaceForensics++
Arch. Val.max. Acc. Acc. in [34]
C 99.47%@9 99.23% 99.26%
S 99.51%@6 99.38% -
CS 99.53%@9 99.25% -
CST 99.50%@6 99.35% -
MesoInc-4 94.03%@50 92.44% 95.23%
Wang et al. 76.01%@2 75.55% -
Durall et al. 57.77%@82 56.68% -
Bayar et al. 96.97%@93 95.82% 98.74%
VideoForensicsHQ
Arch. Val.max. Acc.
C 91.18%@87 88.59%
S 99.40%@36 99.45%
CS 99.54%@45 97.12%
CST 98.15%@20 97.78%
MesoInc-4 68.29%@4 76.73%
Wang et al. 65.76%@5 56.44%
Durall et al. 64.27%@52 61.98%
Bayar et al. 81.51%@5 74.65%
Tab 2. Detection accuracies and validation accuracy maxima (including the epochs
after which they occurred) of our detectors (S, CS, CST) and the existing approaches
of C, MesoInc-4, Wang et al. and Durall et al.. All numbers are averages of two inde-
pendent training runs. The accuracies we report for MesoInc-4 and Bayar et al. on
FaceForensics++ are slightly lower than in [34], because our training procedure has
each detector see only 10% of the training data in each epoch, and because training is
stopped after at most 100 epochs (see section 5).
ing the method by Chollet et al., are clearly able to cope with our training setup
(sampling only 10% of the training data per epoch, for at most 100 epochs). We
interpret this as a strength of XceptionNet-based architectures, which require
less training to achieve near-perfect accuracy on FaceForensics++.
5.2 Generalization across manipulation techniques
To assess the ability of our detectors to generalize to unseen manipulation
techniques, we chose to train them on the FaceForensics++ subsets FS ∪ NT
(FaceSwap + Neural Textures [41]) and F2F ∪ DF (Face2Face [40] and Deep
Fakes) and then test them on the subset they were not trained on. See Ro¨ssler
et al [34] for more information on the subsets. We chose these unions of subsets
because each union thus contains a neural-network-based technique and a more
traditional CG-based one. We consider VideoForensicsHQ not suitable for this
experiment because it contains only one manipulation technique and because its
characteristics (much higher resolution of face regions in most videos and a much
smaller number of identities) are very different from those in FaceForensics++,
which would spoil results when examining generalization to unseen techniques.
Tab. 3 shows that training our detectors on FS ∪NT makes them generalize
well to F2F ∪ DF , where they outperform existing methods. We also observe
that CS outperforms S and C by a large margin, suggesting that combining
colour and spatial noise can help detection. The inverse direction, training on
F2F ∪DF and testing on FS sees low performance for all detectors, suggesting
that this set contains artefacts not seen in F2F∪DF . The subset NT seems to be
easier to generalize to, with our detectors outperforming most existing techniques
by a large margin. For this setting S outperforms CS, which suggests that color
features learnt during training might not generalize well to NT. However, adding
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temporal information seems to remedy this, as CST tops the accuracy of S and
all other techniques.
A closer look at temporal analysis: Since the advantage of CST over
CS when generalizing to NT could be due to the fact that CST dedicates less
capacity to colour and noise information (in order to free GPU memory for
temporal information) and thus is not able to overfit to the training data as
much as CS, we also trained and tested the variant CST \T, which results from
CST by replacing temporal noise extraction with a layer that produces a constant
zero image. This variant has the same “advantage” of having lower capacities
for colour and spatial noise than CS but does not receive temporal information.
As Tab. 3 shows, this ablation leads to a significant drop in accuracy, making
CST \T slightly worse than CS. The lack of capacity is thus not an advantage,
which confirms that temporal information helps generalization.
Arch. Val.max. Acc.F2F Acc.DF
C 99.35%@33 83.41% 93.16%
S 99.52%@10 98.54% 92.92%
CS 99.53%@8 99.53% 98.58%
CST 99.54%@9 99.09% 99.09%
CST \T 99.52%@13 99.36% 99.23%
MesoInc-4 98.96%@56 96.60% 62.45%
Wang et al. 71.17%@2 77.91% 80.03%
Durall et al. 58.62%@44 55.75% 55.45%
Bayar et al. 96.36%@98 62.62% 94.84%
Arch. Val.max. Acc.NT Acc.FS
C 99.33%@11 58.55% 50.09%
S 99.56%@4 90.60% 54.82%
CS 99.64%@6 86.04% 52.17%
CST 99.62%@6 92.84% 55.61%
CST \T 99.59%@5 82.17% 53.16%
MesoInc-4 98.78%@57 71.85% 50.15%
Wang et al. 80.93%@4 84.40% 58.89%
Durall et al. 60.44%@69 53.63% 54.16%
Bayar et al. 98.78%@80 62.45% 50.05%
Tab 3. Validation maxima for the FaceForensics++ subsets FS ∪NT and F2F ∪DF ,
together with the test accuracies for the subsets they were not trained on. All numbers
are averages of three independent training runs.
5.3 Impact of training corpus size
To evaluate the importance of the number of identities in the training set, we
have randomly sampled small training and validation sets from VideoForensic-
sHQ, with different numbers of identities. The models we trained on these sub-
sets were tested on randomly selected VideoForensicsHQ subsets consisting of 15
identities each (different from the training and validation identities, of course).
For each number of identities we have sampled 3 to 5 subsets and report the
averages of the predictions from the models trained on these subsets in Fig. 7.
We observe that our best models achieve close to 100% test accuracy already
for training corpora of only 15 identities (training + validation), which is much
fewer than the 45 identites in our dataset in total, providing evidence that our
dataset is sufficient to generalize to unseen identities, and that our detectors do
not overfit on the training identities.
14 G. Fox et al.
2 10 15
Identities(training+validation)
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
Ac
cu
ra
cy
C S CS CST MesoInception-4 Wang Durall MISL
2 10 15
Id nti ies(training+validation)
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
Ac
cu
ra
cy
C S CS CST MesoInception-4 Wang Durall MISL
Fig. 7. Average test accuracies achieved by models that were trained on VideoForen-
sicsHQ subsets containing different numbers of identities. Models were tested on a
randomly selected subset of 15 VideoForensicsHQ identities. Training was stopped if
10 consecutive epochs without a new maximum for validation accuracy had been seen.
The figure reports average of 3 - 5 runs for each training set size.
6 Conclusion
We presented a new approach to the important problem of detecting manipulated
face videos. Our work is driven by the belief that the most dangerous form
of facial manipulations are those which are challenging for humans to detect.
Foreseeing that face reenactment techniques will be able to deliver a very high
quality of photorealism in the near future, we make two main contributions to
the important problem of forgery detection: First, we contribute a large-scale
dataset of reals and fakes the high visual quality of which is confirmed by a user
study. Second, we present a set of novel neural-network-based detectors that use
spatial and temporal information to outperform the state of the art on our high-
quality manipulated videos. In addition, our detectors generalize well to unseen
rendering methods and unseen test identities. We plan to release our dataset
and models to encourage research on this important problem. Future work can
examine fusing audio and visual cues for better detection. We believe our dataset
to be helpful for this endeavour.
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A User-Study
We conducted a user study to asses how difficult it is for people to spot ma-
nipulations in VideoForensicsHQ compared to FaceForensics++ [34]. We ran-
domly selected 13 manipulated videos VideoForensicsHQ and 13 manipulated
videos from the “Neural Textures” subset of FaceForensics++ [34], created with
the reenactment technique by Thies et al. [41]. Other approaches in FaceForen-
sics++ produce manipulations with much more visible artefacts (see Figure 2
in the main manuscript). In addition, we randomly selected 6 unmodified videos
from VideoForensicsHQ and 7 from FaceForensics++.
In total our study contains 39 videos, randomly shuffled for each user. For
each video, we recorded the answer to the question “Does the video look real or
fake?”. Most participants were computer scientists, with little-to-no knowledge of
face manipulation techniques. 61 subjects participated in the study. On average,
modified videos from VideoForensicsHQ were rated real 65.8% of the time, and
modified videos from FaceForensics++ were rated real only 14.3% of the time. It
is important to note that unmodified videos were also rated as manipulated 15%
of the time, which reflects a baseline error level in human detection performance.
We also asked participants what made them flag a video as modified. Some of
the most common responses were:
1. Various forms of visual artefacts, especially in the mouth interior
2. Non-natural eye movement
3. Body movements and hand gestures do not match the speech
4. Non-natural mouth-related movements e.g. lips are tight when they should
not be, deforming/dislodging jaw and so on.
5. Incorrect audio-lip synchronization
6. A single glitch occurring over 2-3 seconds
7. The spoken language did not match the language of the on-screen text
B Impact of compression
We have evaluated the impact of compression on the test accuracy of all detectors
on our dataset.
Our first experiments showed that applying the same compression to our
data as was applied to FaceForensics++ by Ro¨ssler et al. [34] does not lead to
the expected drop in detection accuracy. The reason is that the face regions in
our dataset (average size 488 × 488 pixels) are much larger than in FaceForen-
sics++(average size 258 × 258). Since compression happens before we detect
square face crops and resize them to the detector input resolution of 299× 299,
compression artifacts hurt the quality of our higher-resolution video much less
than that of Ro¨ssler et al. [34].
This is why we have resized all videos in our dataset to contain the same
average face crop resolution as in FaceForensics++ and then compressed the
result, before we applied face crop extraction. See Fig. 8 for example results.
Tab. 4 reports the expected decrease in detector performance: Light compression
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already leads to significant deterioration, with our detectors still outperforming
previous methods. While S, though based exclusively on high-frequency spatial
information suffers least under light compression, the picture changes as the
compression level is increased: S is now performing worst among our detectors,
which still outperform the baselines. However, they do so by a much smaller
margin and with the exception of MesoInc-4 , that is now on par with the simpler
ones.
Light compression (CRF 23)
Arch. Val.max. Acc.
C 63.34%@23 71.16%
S 84.68%@13 83.58%
CS 84.34%@5 76.33%
CST 83.93%@3 78.65%
MesoInc-4 62.34%@3 68.27%
Wang et al. 57.61%@3 52.40%
Durall et al. 60.91%@15 58.51%
Bayar et al. 76.25%@6 69.99%
Strong compression (CRF 40)
Arch. Val.max. Acc.
C 60.41%@12 64.84%
S 65.48%@4 60.19%
CS 63.06%@5 67.53%
CST 61.10%@8 65.49%
MesoInc-4 56.85%@3 63.89%
Wang et al. 51.20%@3 47.88%
Durall et al. 57.70%@14 53.16%
Bayar et al. 64.31%@5 57.39%
Tab 4. Validation maxima and test accuracies of all evaluated detectors, trained on
the same H.264 compression levels as in Ro¨ssler et al. [34], i.e. “light compression”
(constant rate factor 23) and “strong compression” (constant rate factor 40). Training
was stopped if validation accuracy did not see a new maximum for 10 consecutive
epochs. All numbers are averages of three independent training runs. Since the videos
in our dataset are of much higher resolution than in FaceForensics++, and since in
addition the face regions are much larger relative to the video resolution, we have
resized all our videos such that the average face crop resolution in each video over time
is equal to the one found in FaceForensics++. Only after that we applied compression
and then preprocessed the result as input for the evaluated detectors.
C Parametrization of XceptionNet
Our detectors are composed of the modules Indαβγδ, M and Out, illustrated in
Fig. 9.
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Fig. 8. A comparison of reals and fakes, all resulting from H.264 compression with
constant rate factor 40, and then preprocessed as input to the detectors. If the Video-
ForensicsHQ videos are not resized before they are compressed, compression has much
less impact on video quality and thus detection accuracy. These examples are better
viewed on screen than on paper.
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Fig. 9. The blocks out of which we composed our detectors are identical to the blocks
of XceptionNet [9], except for the numbers of features treated in each layer.  in M and
ζ in Out are determined by the number of output feature in the preceding block.
